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The Suckman case is a particularly hard case because of defendant Suchman's
payment in advance when he took possession of the apartment m 1948. It is obvi-
ous that the position of Suchman was affected adversely by his failure to enter
any defense in the foreclosure action to which he was a party defendant. Techni-
cally, therefore, is lease, and all rights thereunder, were cancelled by the foreclos-
ure action. It would appear that the tribunals were swayed by the hardship on
Suchman, who was placed in the unhappy position of being called upon to pay
rent twice for occupation of the premises.
It is fundamental that one may not be enriched unjustly at the expense of an-
other.2 6 Suchman for some unexplained reason chose not to defend himself in the
foreclosure action. He continued to occupy the premises without any agreement
with the new owner. By his voluntarily continued occupancy, he assumed the obli-
gation to pay rent for the use of the premises. This conclusion is sound, whether
the question is treated in the light of the common law or under so-called emer-
gency legislation. Therefore, better reasoning suggests that Suchman should have
been designated as a statutory tenant, and as such, the nonpayment summary pro-
ceeding against him was justified by law 27  Pkyllis MacKay
MORTGAGES. RIGHT OF A SECOND PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGEE WHEN A
FORECLOSURE OF THE FIRST MORTGAGE EXHAUSTS THE SECURITY.
In Brown v. Jensen,1 a recent California case, plaintiff sold her real property
to the defendants and took a second deed of trust to secure a note for $7,200 given
as part of the purchase price. The first deed of trust went to a loan association to
secure a note for $11,300 which was also part of the payment. Defendant defaulted
in payment on both notes. The loan association foreclosed, apparently exercising
the power of sale in the deed of trust, and bid it in for $11,876.63 and received
title from the trustee. Finding her security gone and the note unpaid, plaintiff sued
on the note. Held, reversing the judgment of the District Court of Appeal, no re-
covery Plaintiff has no action on the note; her action is one for deficiency judg-
ment and there can be no deficiency judgment on a purchase money deed of trust.
In order to understand the reasoning behind this decision, it is necessary to
26 BLAcK, LAW DicTIONARY 1705.
27 If a tenant holds over without authority under such circumstances as to negative the
landlord's consent to the holding, or to rebut the presumption of a renewal of the lease gov-
erning the amount of rent, the tenant may be liable for the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises. Colyear v Tobriner, 7 Cal. 735, 62 P.2d 741 (1936). In California
the general rule is that, it is the duty of the tenant to surrender possession of the premises on
the expiration of his term. Ryland v. Appelbaum, 70 Cal.App. 268, 233 Pac. 356 (1924). The
landlord's successor's interest may maintain an action without attornment. Waylan v. Lathan,
89 Cal.App. 55, 264 Pac. 766 (1928), Hewitt v. Justice's Court, 131 Cal.App. 439, 21 P.2d 641
(1933). CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161a provides for an action of unlawful detamer: "In either
of the following cases, a person who holdsover and continues in possession of real property,
after a three-day written notice to quit the same, shall have been served upon him, or if there
is a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as prescribed
in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this
chapter. 2. Where the property has been duly sold, upon the foreclosure, by proceedings taken
as prescribed in this code, of a mortgage, or under an express power of sale contained therein,
executed by him, or a person under whom he claims, and the title under the foreclosure has been
duly perfected. See also GODDARD, CALIFORNIA LANDLORD-TENANT LAW AND PROCEDuRE 50, 51,
55, 186, 189.
1 Brown v Jensen, 41 Cal.2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).
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look at the legislative controls placed on the enforcement of financial obligations
secured by mortgages and deeds of trust.
Section 726 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that when an
indebtedness is secured by a mortgage on real or personal property, the security
must be exhausted before there can be a suit on the note.2 The original purpose
of Section 726 in requiring that the security should be exhausted prior to suit on
the note was to prevent the debtor from being subject to more than one suit; not
to eliminate a right of the creditor.3 Therfore when the security has been exhausted
through no fault of the mortgagee, as by foreclosure of the first mortgage, he may
bring an action on the note, since foreclosure proceedings would be an idle act.
4
It was arguable whether Califorma Code of Civil Procedure Section 726 ap-
plied to deeds of trust, but the question was settled in Bank of Italy v. Bentley.6
The court said:
".. it must be held that, either by reason of implied agreement or by reason of public
policy, the holder of a note secured by a deed of trust must first exhaust the security
before resorting to the personal liability of the trustor.' 7
Soon after this decision, the California Legislature adopted Section 580a of the
Code of Civil Procedure which set forth the procedure by which deeds of trust
should be foreclosed.
Sections 726, which applies to mortgages, and 580a, which applies to trust
deeds, are comparable in that they both provide for the fair market value rule to
limit the amount of a deficiency judgment sought when the foreclosure sale does
not yield a sufficient sum to pay the note. This limitation was grouped with the
moratorium statutes enacted during the recent depression period to protect the
debtor. The rule provides that a deficiency judgment after the sale of the security
cannot exceed the difference between the amount of the original indebtedness and
the value of the security at the time of foreclosure, as fixed by a court-appointed
appraiser, no matter what the property sold for on foreclosure. Before this addi-
tion to Section 726 and the enactment of Section 580a, a holder of a note secured
by a trust deed or a mortgagee could bid in at a nominal figure at the foreclosure
sale, acquire the property and still obtain a large deficiency judgment against the
debtor.8
2 CAL.U. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 726 provides in part: "There can be but one form of action
for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real
or personal property which action must be in accordance with the provision of this chap-
ter ... " The basic requirement of a single action includes a judicial sale of the security and
a deficiency judgment for the balance due on the debt, when required.
3 Ould v. Stoddard, 54 Cal. 613 (1880), Felton v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 36 Pac. 676 (1894),
Commercial Bank v. Kershener, 120 Cal. 495, 52 Pac. 848 (1898), Savings Bank of San Diego
County v. Central Market, 122 Cal. 28, 54 Pac. 273 (1898), Murphey v. Helman Commercial
Trust and Savings Bank, 43 CalApp. 579, 185 Pac. 485 (1919). For a full treatise see Com-
ment, 31 CArw. L. Rxv. 429 (1943).
4 Merced Security Savings Bank v. Casaccia, 103 Cal. 641, 37 Pac. 648 (1894), Crescent
Lumber Co. v. Larson,. 166 Cal. 168, 135 Pac. 502 (1913), Ferry v. Fisk, 54 CalApp. 763,
202 Pac. 964 (1921), Hellman Commercial Trust and Savings Bank v. Maurice, 105 Cal.App.
653, 288 Pac. 683 (1930). As to the application of this rule to the second mortgagee see Sav-
ings Bank of San Diego County v. Central Market, 122 Cal. 28, 54 Pac. 273 (1878), Giandeim
v. Ranirey, 11 CaApp.2d 469, 54 P.2d 91 (1936).
5 CA=r. CODE CiV. PROC. § 726.
6 217 Cal. 644, 20 P.2d 940 (1933).
7 Id. at 658, 20 P.2d at 945.
8 22 CALwI. L. REV. 180 (1934).
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During the depression era, further restrictions were placed on the rights of a
holder of a note secured by a trust deed. The first paragraph of Section 5806 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1933 and reenacted in 1935,
states:
"No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for
failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust,
or mortgage, given to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real
property"
Section 580d of the California Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1941, pro-
vides:
"No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a deed of
trust or mortgage upon real property thereafter executed in any case in which the real
property has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained
in such a mortgage or deed of trust."
These two statutes and the fair market value rule of Sections 726 and 580a
virtually eliminate the aforementioned evil of the creditor bidding in cheaply at a
foreclosure sale, obtaining the property, and holding the debtor to a large de-
ficiency judgment.
Bank of Italy v. Bentley and the subsequent enactment of Section 580a deter-
mined that the security of deed of trust, like that of a mortgage, must be exhausted
first before there can be any action on the note. But, before Brown v. Jensen was
adjudicated, there was no decision which limited the creditor's rights where the
security was exhausted through no fault of the creditor.
In Hillen v. Soule,9 a 1935 District Court of Appeals case, the court was faced
with the same problem as the case under discussion, but since the deed of trust
was executed before the enactment of the 580 Series, it was held that those restric-
tions on foreclosures and deficiency judgments of deeds of trust were inapplicable
and a recovery was allowed on the note.
However, in the decision, Justice Spence, who wrote a dissenting opinion in
the present case, said by way of dicta that recovery on the note should be allowed.
"It is sufficient answer to state that this is not an action for a deficiency judg-
ment. The security was exhausted by the sale under the first deed of trust and no
sale was had under respondent's deed of trust. We are therefore of the opinion
that the provisions of said Section 580(b) are inapplicable." 10
The Ohio courts had difficulty in arriving at a solution in the same type of
case. In Carr v. Cleveland Trust Co.,:1 the Trust Company held a second mort-
gage on Carr's property The Home Owners Loan Corporation, holder of the first
mortgage, foreclosed, naming the Trust Company as party defendant. The Trust
Company answered, requesting that their note be satisfied from the proceeds of
the foreclosure of the first mortgage, but the sale did not realize a sufficient amount
to pay any part of the Trust Company's note. After the statute of limitations had
run on a deficiency judgment, the Trust Company sued on the note.
The Ohio Court of Appeals held that there could be no recovery since the
9 7 CalApp.2d 45, 45 P.2d 349 (1935).
lOld. at 47, 45 P.2d at 349.
1148 0. Law Abs. 179, 74 N.E.2d 124 (1947).
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action was for a deficiency judgment and that it was barred by the statute of
limitations.
"But in whatever light we view the proceedings which took place, either by way of
foreclosure or by separate personal judgment on the note, one fact stands out m bold
relief and that is that a deficiency judgment resulted from the entire proceedings by
reason whereof the plaintiffs are entitled to whatever benefits accrue from the pro-
visions of the deficiency judgment act-so-called.'1 2
The majority of the court in Brown v. Jensen felt this was the correct interpreta-
tion of a deficiency judgment, quoting it in the majority opinion.la
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed this decision,'- saying,
"The very word 'deficiency' denotes a lack, shortage or insufficiency and presupposes
that a creditor has already realized some amount of his clanm from the security held.1 5
. a deficiency judgment is the balance of personal indebtedness above the amount
realized on the sale of the mortgaged property securing such mdebtedness.16 . Ac-
cording to our understanding a secured obligation is one which, when the time comes
to enforce payment of the claim, has at least some eisting security to which the cred-
itor may look for his money."'17
In view of the fact that there are nothing but contrary decisions in other juris-
dictions,' 8 how did the Supreme Court come to set aside the interpretation set
forth in Hillen v. Soule and decide that there can be no action on a note secured
by a purchase money deed of trust. Let us first look at the reasoning in the de-
cision of Brown v. fensen.
Justice Carter, writing the majority opinion of the court, grants that there can
be an action on a note secured by a mortgage when the security has been exhausted
through no fault of the mortgagor.19 But the court says that plaintiff's action is
one for a deficiency judgment and since her note was obtained as part of the pur-
chase price for the sale of realty and is secured by a deed of trust on that realty,
she has no cause of action because hers is a purchase money trust deed and, accord-
ig to Section 580 (a), there cannot be a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure of
a purchase money deed of trust.
To substantiate the conclusion that this is an action for a deficiency judgment,
the court states that a deficiency "may consist of the whole debt because a de-
ficiency is nothing more than the difference between the security and the debt."20
The decision then quotes from the Court of Appeals decision in Carr v. Cleve-
12 Id. at 187, 74 N.E.2d at 128, 129.
1341 Cal.2d at 198, 259 P.2d at 427.
14 Carr v. Home Owners Loan Corporation, 148 Ohio St. 533, 76 N.E.2d 389 (1947).
1' Id. at 539, 76 N.E.2d at 393.
16 Ibid.
17Id. at 540, 76 N.E.2d at 394.
1 In U.S.B. and M. Liquidation Corp. v. Hilton, 307 Mass. 114, 116, 29 N.E.2d 684, 685
(1940), the court said, "But the very cases that have held these moratorium laws constitutional
have laid stress upon the consideration that they were directed primarily to regulation of the
remedy and that they did not substantially impair the obligation of the contract The
more recent decisions in New York to which our attention has been called have held these
'Moratorium Laws' inapplicable even in New York to cases where the security has been wholly
swept away by a foreclosure of a prior mortgage." Also see Weisel v. Hagdahl Realty Co.,
241 App.Div. 314, 271 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1934), Home Building and Loan Association v Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
19 Brown v. Jensen, supra at 195, 259 P.2d at 426.
20Id. at 198, 259 P.2d at 427.
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land Trust Co. which was later reversed on these grounds by the Supreme Court
of Ohio.
2 1
It is further stated that the broad protections of 580(b) were for the benefit of
the debtor and that the purpose of the after sale reference in the section is that the
security be exhausted, and that results after a sale under the first trust deed.
It is obvious that the court had to extend itself to create such an interpreta-
tion of Section 580b. The more logical conclusion would be to follow the dicta
set forth in Hillen v. Soule, based on the rule which is applied when the security
is exhausted in a mortgage; namely, to allow suit on the note.
A deficiency judgment in California,22 and by the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions,2 demands a prior sale under the power of sale of a deed of trust or
a foreclosure under the mortgage by the creditor seeking the deficiency judgment.
There was no such sale or foreclosure in this case. True, there was a foreclosure
under the first mortgage, but how should that affect the second, other than to
diminish the security It is stretching Section 580b almost to the breaking point,
and perhaps beyond, to say that foreclosure of the first mortgage affects the second
so as to limit, and, in this case, destroy the creditor's rights.
Glenn On Mortgages, in discussing the rights of the second mortgagee after a
foreclosure action by the first, says, "But suppose there is no surplus at all and
thus the second mortgagee has no security then he is nothing but a general
creditor to the full extent of his debt. Since these deficiency judgment laws do not
operate as restriction upon general debts, it follows that they do not govern the
second mortgage."2'
Before the depression, restrictions on deficiency judgments were relatively un-
known, 5 but the inequity of large deficiency judgments during this period mani-
fested a necessity for a statutory public policy to protect the debtor from oppres-
sive deficiency judgments on foreclosure. 26 While the original enactments might
have been considered as only temporary restrictions, it soon became apparent that
these restraints equalized the benefits and detriments of mortgagor and mortgagee
without driving investment from this field.
Therefore, it might be argued that the court is merely following the impetus
of the legislature in restricting the rights of the creditor under a purchase money
deed of trust or mortgage. The recent case of Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Samp-
sell2 7 and the subsequent enactment of the second paragraph of Section 580b sub-
stantiates the fact that the legislature is interested in limiting deficiency judg-
ments. While the facts of that case are involved, the district court of appeal in
the end result allowed deficiency judgment on a chattel mortgage that was exe-
cuted to secure a note given as part of the purchase price. But an addition to
Section 580b, enacted in 1949, precluded a creditor from obtaining a deficiency
21 Carr v. Home Owners Loan Corporation, supra note 16.
22Hatch v. Security First National Bank, 19 Cal.2d 254, 120 P.2d 869 (1942), Bank of
America v. Gillett, 36 Cal.App.2d 453, 97 P.2d 875 (1940).
23 Carr v. Home Owners Loan Corporation, supra at 541, 76 N.E.2d at 393, Stretch v.
Murphy, 166 Ore. 439, 446, 112 P.2d 1018, 1020; Phillips v Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
88 F.2d 188, 189 (8th Cir. 1942).
24 2 GLENN ON MORTGAGES 878.
25 Before the 1930 depression period, Oregon was the only state to prohibit deficiency
judgments, and then it was only in cases of purchase money mortgages.
26 Bank of America v. United States, 84 F Supp. 387, 388 (1949).
27 51 Cal.App.2d 180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942).
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judgment on a purchase money chattel mortgage or trust deed on personal
property 2 8
The denial of a deficiency judgment after sale or foreclosure of a purchase
money trust deed or mortgage is further justified by the fact that the creditor can
assure himself of a first lien on the property 2 Also he is in a position to demand a
sufficiently large down payment so that if the property diminishes in value and
the purchaser defaults on the note, there won't be any necessity for a deficiency
judgment since a foreclosure action should bring a sufficient sum to pay the in-
debtedness.
Brown v. Jensen strengthens this line of reasoning. The loan association valued
the property at only $11,300 and the plaintiff took a note for $7,200 so it is easy
to conclude that either the purchase price was too high, or the down payment was
too small; or both. Also the plaintiff could have bid in at the foreclosure sale,
returning what she received via the loan company and recovered the property
without suffering any serious loss.
However, this whole line of reasoning does more than equalize the positions
of mortgagor and mortgagee; it places the risk of property value deterioration on
the vendor without affording him the benefits of an increasing market-an uncon-
scionable result.
The court in Weisel v. Hagdahl Realty Co.30 had something to say in this regard:
"However, if we consider these statutes [Moratorium Laws] from the position of
the mortgagor, a somewhat different view is presented. Assuming for the moment that
the property was equal m value to the sum of the mortgages, if the property is bought
by the first mortgagee and the mortgagor is compelled to pay a deficiency judgment
m favor of the second and third mortgages, he is obligated to pay something in addi-
tion when m fact the property was worth the aggregate amounts of the mortgages.
If there had been one mortgage for the total amount instead of three, there could have
been no deficiency judgment. The answer is that three mortgages were made as a mat-
ter of choice by the mortgagor who knew at the time that they differed in respect to
the priority of lien. It may be argued that the second and third mortgagees should have
attended the sale and bid a sufficient sum to protect their respective interest. A like
privilege was open to the mortgagor. As a practical question, ordinarily neither would
be m position to take such action, and neither was legally bound to do so."' (Em-
phasis added.)
History bears out the fact that deficiency judgments can be oppressive and a
debtor should be protected by legislative and judicial action. But the controls
should not be enforced where the facts are not applicable to the protective statutes
and decisions and an unnecessary extension of the rule leaves the creditor without
a remedy. When there is a default on the secured obligation, public policy de-
mands the security be exhausted before there is any action on the note but it should
be remembered that the note, not the mortgage, is the primary obligation and the
creditor's rights steming from the note should not be adversely affected by deteri-
oration of the security Whether it be a purchase money deed of trust or any other
type of secured obligation, the creditor should not be denied a remedy when the
security is exhausted through no fault of the creditor. Charles H. Clifford
28 CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. §5806: "Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or
mortgage have been given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of both
real and personal property, no deficiency judgment shall be at any time undeer any one thereof."
29 CAT . Crv. CoD § 2898: "A mortgage or deed of trust given for the price of real prop-
erty at the time of its conveyance has priority over all other liens created against the purchaser,
subject to operation of the recording laws."
30 241 App.Div. 314, 271 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1934).
3lId. at 319, 271 N.Y. Supp. at 635.
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